August 2010invisible

Laufenberg Economic Quarterly

Daniel E. Laufenberg, Ph.D.

The views expressed here reflect the views of Daniel Laufenberg as of the date referenced. These views may change as economic fundamentals and market conditions change. This commentary is provided as a general source of information only and is not intended to provide investment advice for individual investor circumstances. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Executive summary

  • The U.S. economy grew 3.2 percent over the four quarters ending in the second quarter of 2010. I expect that real growth will be at least this fast over the remainder of this year and all of next year. Pent-up consumer demand, a slight rebound in housing, and further solid gains in business fixed investment should lead the way.

  • According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a very disappointing 2.4 percent annual rate in the second quarter, following an upward revised gain of 3.7 percent in the first quarter. The shortfall was due in large part the sluggishness in consumer spending, which registered a gain of only 1.6 percent. Nevertheless, I remain confident that consumer spending will improve markedly at some point in the second half of 2010, although the exact timing of this improvement is unclear.

  • Consumers may have disappointed in the first half of the year but they are not going to remain sidelined forever. Real disposable income grew at a 4.4 percent annual rate in the second quarter, following a gain of 1.7 percent in the first quarter. In addition, interest rates are extremely low, house prices are starting to recover a bit, and household balance sheets have stabilized. Credit availability may be strained a bit, but most consumers seem to have access to what they need. Finally, consumer spending actually had a bit of upward momentum at the end of the second quarter, despite claims to the contrary.

  • In the second quarter, business investment, exports, and government spending added more to output growth than anticipated a few months ago, while imports detracted more. Indeed, real gross domestic purchases (a measure of overall demand for goods and services in the U.S.) climbed 5.1 percent in the second quarter, following a gain of 3.9 percent in the preceding quarter.

  • Private payroll jobs have increased 630 thousand through the first seven months of the year. Although positive, job growth has not been as robust as I had expected. I believe that is about to change. Seasonal factors, which may have helped depress job gains over the last few months, are about to boost payroll job growth over the next few months.

  • The Federal Reserve has changed its rhetoric, as well as its policy signal, once again. Apparently, in response to the downward shift in the consensus outlook, the Fed has announced that it will not reduce its balance sheet after all. Instead, they plan to provide near-term support for debt markets by swapping mortgage-backed securities for longer-term Treasury obligations. The 10-year Treasury yield, which is already low, should remain so for quite some time.

  • Fear still dominates investors' attitudes, which means that it is probably a good time to buy risk that is out of favor. At the moment, that seems to be equities. Markets can and will correct from time to time. But as contrarian as it may sound, there is insufficient greed at the moment to suggest that risky assets are overvalued; that is, be a buyer and not a seller.

Forecast details

The Economic Expansion Continues—Really!

The Laufenberg Economic Quarterly (LEQ) has become a bit more cautious about the U.S. economic outlook over the last few months, but not nearly as cautious as the consensus. In particular, the consensus now expects real growth to be very sluggish in the second half of the year, owing in large part to the disappointing pace of real growth in the second quarter. Some economists are even talking about a “double-dip” recession again.

According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), real gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a 2.4 percent annual rate in the second quarter, which was slower than the upward revised first-quarter pace of 3.7 percent and a slightly less robust fourth-quarter pace of 5.0 percent. Obviously if you extend this recent downward trend in growth rates, the forecast does not look very promising. However, the “straight-line” method of forecasting seldom works, especially at turning points in the business cycle. Hence, I doubt that the U.S. economy is as sluggish as the recent downward trend in growth rates suggest.

Although I too was disappointed by the BEA’s estimate of second-quarter real GDP growth, there is other evidence to suggest that this sluggishness will be temporary and not a threat to the economic recovery that I believe is well underway. First, manufacturing output, as measured in the industrial production data reported by the Federal Reserve Board, grew at a 7.9 percent annual rate in the second quarter, following a 6.1 percent advance in the first quarter. Moreover, it does not look as if the industrial sector is about to rollover as some economists have suggested. In this regard, the Institute of Supply Management (ISM) composite index for manufacturing in July was at 55.5, down from 56.2 in the prior month. The July drop in the ISM manufacturing index caused many commentators to argue that this was a sign that the industrial sector was deteriorating. I disagree. Recall that an index reading above 50 implies that the sector is expanding. Thus, the industrial sector is still expanding, albeit at a slightly less robust pace. According to the ISM, the past relationship between the composite index for manufacturing and the overall economy indicates that the average index for January through July (58 percent) corresponds to a 5.4 percent increase in real GDP. In addition, if the index for July (55.5 percent) is annualized it corresponds to a 4.5 percent increase in real GDP annually.1 Obviously, the industrial sector of the economy is doing just fine.

However, some contend that an improving industrial sector is less important to the overall economy now than it was in the past. As shown in Chart 1, since the first quarter of 1972, industrial output has more than doubled in value, while real GDP has nearly tripled. As a result, industrial output as a percent of GDP has fallen to 24 percent in the second quarter of 2010 from 33 percent in the first quarter of 1972. Based on the foregoing, there seems to be some truth to the argument that the industrial sector is less relevant than it was. But there is more to consider than just relative size. For example, the two series seem to track together, even though the industrial sector is smaller relative to the overall economy; that is, when the industrial sector is deteriorating, so too is the overall economy and when the industrial sector is improving, so too is the overall economy. As shown in Chart 2, the industrial sector plunged in 2008 and early 2009, but has improved more recently. The same scenario applies to real GDP in 2008 and early 2009, albeit less dramatically. Therefore, be careful not to dismiss the information provided by this relationship, which at the moment is that both industrial output and real GDP are tracking higher.

chart 1

The corollary to this view is that the service sector has gained in importance over the last four decades. So far during the current recovery, the service sector appears to be lagging the industrial sector. That may be about to change with stable asset prices, especially house prices. According to the ISM, the non-manufacturing index of business conditions rose to 54.3 in July from 53.8 in June, suggesting that growth in the service sector accelerated a bit in July.

Second, the consumer sector is not as sluggish as some commentators contend. Very recently I heard David Rosenberg, former chief economist for Merrill Lynch, on CNBC note that all of the small gain in consumer spending in the second quarter occurred in April and that the consumer sector was in a downward spiral at the end of the quarter. I disagree with that statement, although I admit that a very narrow measure of consumer spending supports Rosenberg’s view.
2 Based on a most comprehensive measure of consumer spending—real personal consumption expenditures as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts, the level of spending in June was already 0.5 percent at an annual rate above the average for the second quarter. By historical standards, this represents considerable upward momentum to consumer spending going into the third quarter. In addition, consumer income growth has been solid, interest rates are historically low, balance sheets have mended somewhat, and credit seems available to most. Many economists would agree with the first three points—real disposable income grew 4.4 percent in the second quarter, the personal saving rate climbed to 6.2 percent in the second quarter, and prices of both real and financial assets for the most part have bounced off their lows.

chart 2

The problem may be that consumers are not yet convinced that the recent income growth is permanent. This uncertainty, according to the life-cycle, permanent-income hypothesis of consumption, causes consumers to save their income gain rather than spend it. Once consumers are convinced that the income gain is permanent, then they spend it. I expect that such a confirmation will occur sometime before yearend, once the employment picture improves a bit and their tax situation for 2011 becomes clearer.

The disagreement may be with my fourth point—consumers have access to credit. Let me explain. Based on data provided by the Federal Reserve Board, the total level of consumer credit outstanding in June was down somewhat from the 2008 level but roughly in line with the 2006 level. What I found interesting was that the level of consumer credit outstanding at commercial banks at the end of June was actually 55 percent higher than at the end of 2006 and 31 percent higher than at the end of 2008. Apparently, commercial banks are making consumer loans. The same could not be said for other types of private financial institutions. This is especially true of pools of securitized consumer loans, which now hold less than a quarter of the loans they held in 2006. I contend that this development actually may be good for the long-run health of consumer credit. By the way, consumer loans held by the federal government have increased faster since 2006 than any other financial institution—from $57.6 billion at the end of 2006 to $222.6 billion at the end of June.

Last but certainly not least, measures of domestic demand for final goods and services were very robust in the first half of the year. As shown in Chart 3, real gross domestic purchases, which represent real GDP less net exports, grew a whopping 5.1 percent at an annual rate in the second quarter, following a gain of 3.9 percent in the first quarter. More impressively, real final sales to domestic purchasers, which exclude the contribution to growth from the change in inventories, still grew 4.1 percent at an annual rate in the second quarter, but only 1.3 percent in the first quarter. In other words, the good news is that final domestic sales jumped sharply in the second quarter of 2010. The bad news is that foreign producers in the form of imports satisfied an increasing share of domestic sales. This would be considered a problem except that output by U.S. manufacturers, as measured by the Federal Reserve Board, also was up 7.9 percent last quarter.

chart 3

Also in Chart 3, there are very few episodes where the quarterly growth rates of real GDP varied dramatically from the growth rate of real domestic purchases such as they did in the second quarter. But there does seem to be a meaningful pattern. That is, the overall economy tends to do better in the near term when real gross domestic purchases grow at a faster pace than real GDP (when the solid line is above the broken line) than when real purchases grow at a pace slower than real GDP (when the solid line is below the broken line). If this is the case, then the upturn in the growth of real gross domestic purchases in the first half of the year relative to real GDP growth bode well for real GDP growth over the remainder of 2010.

The prospect of higher taxes complicates Fed policy

At its meeting in July, the Federal Reserve’s policy committee decided to keep the targeted federal funds rate at 0.25 percent and to maintain the size, if not the composition, of its balance sheet. This was in response to a slight downgrade in the committee’s near-term forecast for the economy. Recall that a few months ago the Fed was talking about an exit strategy from its balance sheet policy (referred to as quantitative easing). Apparently, that exit strategy has been put on hold. The Fed’s plan now is to replace the mortgage-backed securities that mature or are prepaid with longer-term Treasury obligations. The market responded to the news by pushing Treasury yields lower; the yield on the 10-year Treasury note fell to a record low of 2.6 percent.

But there may be more to this move than a slower than expected second-quarter growth rate. Instead of looking back as many commentators have suggested, the Fed may be looking forward. In particular, the Fed may be responding to the increased likelihood that federal income taxes will rise substantially at the end of 2010. That is, various tax cuts enacted during the Bush administration are scheduled to sunset at the end of this year in the absence of new legislation extending them. If the cuts are allowed to expire, it could mean a loss of nearly a percentage point of real GDP growth in 2011 and another quarter of a percentage point in 2012. The Fed could try to offset some of the lost output from higher taxes by maintaining the federal funds rate near zero well into 2011 and by lowering longer-term interest rates further through shifts in its balance sheet.

It is important to note that the LEQ forecast in the past assumed that most of the tax cuts would be extended. There were two reasons for this view. First, it is very difficult to forecast political outcomes with any degree of accuracy anytime, but especially in an election year. Second, given the uncertainty about whether the recovery can be sustained, I was confident that most of the tax cuts would be allowed to continue. And even for the few tax cuts that I thought would be allowed to expire, policymakers would not allow the tax code to revert completely. More importantly, I thought that legislation to this effect would have been passed by now, adding clarity to the outlook for at least another year. After all, one of the issues that may be discouraging businesses from adding to their payrolls and consumers from spending is the ongoing uncertainty about what the tax code will be next year.

Since the legislation needed to extend the tax cuts seems less likely now, I must adjust my outlook accordingly. The bulk of the adverse effect on growth will occur around the expiration date; that is, the fourth quarter of 2010 in anticipation of the tax hike and the first quarter of 2011 in response to the tax hike. On the other hand, the adverse effect from higher taxes on economic activity will be offset in part by a still very accommodative monetary policy from the Federal Reserve. For this reason, any pullback on the part of consumers and businesses is likely to be temporary. After all, even though taxes will be higher, the uncertainty about taxes in the near term will have eased, allowing people to make more informed decisions.

So what has changed in the LEQ forecast?

There are several near-term changes to the forecast, including somewhat sluggish consumer spending over the next four quarters, less robust real GDP growth over the same period, and much lower long-term interest rates late this year and most of 2011. First, consumers seem reluctant to spend even though they have enjoyed solid income growth over the first half of the year. Based on the latest data from the BEA, real consumer spending grew a subdued 1.8 percent at an annual rate in the first half of 2010, much slower than the 3.1 percent increase in real disposable income. This frugality on the part of consumers almost suggests that taxpayers are saving in anticipation of higher taxes in 2011.3 If this is the case, then the adverse effect of higher taxes on consumer spending may be spread over the next three quarters rather than all of it occurring in the first quarter of 2011. In other words, further gains in income will do very little to encourage spending in the near term. As a result, the LEQ forecast for real consumer spending (personal consumption expenditures) has been downgraded for the next four quarters to show an average gain of 2.2 percent versus 3.5 percent in the May LEQ. Of course, if Congress does decide to enact legislation that would extend the tax cuts, the forecast would be adjusted upward accordingly.

Second, since consumer spending represents 70 percent of the economy, the forecast for real GDP growth has been downgraded over the next year as well to 3.2 percent from 3.7 percent. The outlook for real GDP growth was not adjusted downward as dramatically as consumer spending growth because the future trajectory of longer-term interest rates in the current forecast is far more accommodative than it was in the May forecast. This suggests that fixed investment, both residential and nonresidential, actually does better than most expect at the moment. Moreover, with a more subdued outlook for consumer spending, the growth of imports slows. I am a bit bewildered by the argument made by market commentators in this regard. When imports are strong in China (a net exporting economy), it is perceived as a sign of strength, but when imports are strong in the U.S. (a net importing economy), it is perceived as a sign of weakness. Again, I would like to reference the real gross domestic purchases data discussed earlier that suggested that final domestic demand in the U.S. was very strong in the first half of 2010. I remain encouraged by such a development.

Finally, long-term interest rates, which fell sharply following the Fed’s announcement that it would buy long-term Treasury obligations with the funds from the prepayment of the mortgage-backed securities held on its balance sheet, are expected to remain low well into 2011. At the moment, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note is 2.6 percent, well below the 3.9 percent average for the third quarter of 2010 shown in the May LEQ. Although yields on Treasury notes and bonds are expected to be lower in the near term, I doubt that the yield will stay this low very long. After all, the economy may not be as robust as I had anticipated earlier, but I it is unlikely to be as weak as the consensus now seems to expect. For this reason, I have the yield on the 10-year Treasury note ending the year at a level only slightly higher than it is now but then renewing its upward trend more dramatically in 2011.

Most other items of the forecast have been revised accordingly. Of special note is the outlook for the civilian unemployment rate. Although the LEQ still shows the unemployment rate trending downward to a level near 8.0 percent by the end of 2011, more of the improvement in this rate is now expected to occur next year. The interesting aspect of this forecast is that it will be changes to the demographics of the labor force more so than job growth that will drive this result. After all, boomers are starting to retire, ready or not.

Introducing the "LQ Stock Allocation Indicator"

Once again, market participants have become fearful, selling off risk in favor of safety. It is not unusual, with every disappointing economic report at this stage of the business cycle, for fear of a double dip recession to grip investors. It seems to happen frequently during every recovery. But every time, the economy eventually improves. Despite many claims to the contrary, I believe that this time will prove to be no different. Recall that during the economic recovery of 2002-2003, there was great concern about whether the recovery could be sustained, in large part because of the absence of any meaningful job growth. Indeed, I wrote an essay in 2004, which was more than two years into the recovery at that time, highlighting the lack of jobs in the U.S. so far during that recovery and suggesting that meaningful job growth was ahead. 4 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. economy created over two million jobs each year from 2004 to 2006. A similar situation occurred in the early stage of the economic recovery in the 1990s. In an essay dated October 8, 1993, which was nearly two and a half years into that recovery, I noted that the “relatively sluggish performance by the labor market has raised concern about the ability of the U.S. economy to create jobs.” 5 Over the seven years from 1993 to 1999, the U.S. economy created 21.1 million new payroll jobs. I conclude that we seem to be in a similar situation at the moment. The unfortunate difference is that we do not officially know yet that the recovery is underway. But if I am right that the recovery began last summer, the U.S. is only now entering its second year of recovery. If the last two recoveries are any guide, job growth may not really get started in a major way until 2011—but it will start.

As such, the investment implications remain the same. Equities, non-government taxable bonds and tax-exempt bonds still look attractive, but asset selection can make a difference. In a broader sense, asset allocation standards should be followed carefully over the next several years in the wake of what is likely to be very volatile markets. This includes frequent rebalancing of investment portfolios to keep risk within investors’ tolerance levels. Please remember that business cycles have not been repealed.

I find it interesting that market participants are reluctant to buy equities because prices have fallen recently. What ever happen to following the old adage—buy low, sell high. In this regard, I present what I refer to as the LQ Stock Allocation Indicator, which provides a cyclical indicator of when to overweight and to underweight equities in diversified portfolios. As shown in Chart 4, the LQ indicator seems to move counter to the S&P 500 stock price index—when the indicator is low, stock prices are high, and vice versa. But there is more information in this indicator than the obvious. For example, when the indicator pushes above a reading of 100, it signals a time to overweight equities in your portfolio. This was true in 2002 and again in 2009, when in both cases the indicator moved through 100 just a few months before the S&P 500 stock price index bottomed. In addition, the indicator provides a signal to investor to underweight equities. This signal is not as defined as the signal to overweight. It occurs when the value of the indicator has stabilized over an extended period following a pronounced decline. Certainly, investors could sell equities as the indicator falls, but they would be better served to wait until the indicator has leveled off at a lower level. This signal was provided by the indicator twice over the last twelve years, once in 1999-2000 and again in 2007. Based on its latest observation, the indicator suggests that investors can still get paid to be overweight equities.

chart 4

It goes without saying that there is no guarantee this relationship will be hold in the future. Indeed, a major concern may be that there are too few cyclical observations (only two business cycles shown) to claim that the indicator accurately signals peaks and troughs in the stock market. For this reason, I would caution readers not to rely on this indicator without reservation. On the other hand, do not dismiss it either. In analysis of this sort, the signal from one indicator should be verified using the signals of other indicators that attempt to measure the same event in a different way. It should be viewed as another bit of information that investors can use to help them make asset allocation decisions.


1 See July 2010 Manufacturing ISM Report On Business, Institute of Supply Management, August 2, 2010.

2 According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the June level of retail sales adjusted for inflation was 1.5 percent at an annual rate below the average for the second quarter, suggesting a very weak finish to the quarter. Moreover, if auto dealers, gasoline stations, and building supplies dealers were excluded from the total, retail sales declined 0.1 percent in July. Moreover, in real terms, according to the St. Louis Fed, July retail sales increased a mere 0.1 percent. In contrast, unit sales of new light vehicles rebounded in July and the service index from the ISM was still above 50, suggesting that consumers were not as stressed going into the third quarter as some economists would make us believe.

3 The Ricardian equivalence proposition is an economic theory that suggests consumers internalize the government's budget constraint to the extent that they can anticipate future tax increases. At the moment, consumers face a very strong likelihood of higher taxes in 2011. That is, if Congress does not pass legislation to the contrary, taxes will rise next year. The Ricardian equivalent suggests that taxpayers would put aside savings to pay the future tax rise; i.e. they would willingly buy the bonds issued by the government, and would reduce their current consumption to do so. The effect on aggregate demand would be the same as if the government had chosen to tax now.

4 See Daniel E. Laufenberg, "More jobs, but when and where?", Economic Perspective, American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., January 2004, pp. 11-14.

5 See Daniel E. Laufenberg, "Is the great American job machine broken?", Economic Perspective, IDS Financial Services Inc., pp. 12-17

A less robust US economy longer term

Doomsayers once again seem to be dominating the airways and the newsprint with their bearish scenarios for the U.S. economy. I continue to believe that they are too bearish about the economy in the near term, although there may be an element of truth to their assessment of the economy in the longer term. In other words, I too am concerned that the trend growth rate for the U.S. economy over the next decade may not be as high as it was over the last couple of decades. The primary source of this concern is that U.S. recessions may occur more frequently in the future than in the last three decades.

Let me explain how shorter business cycles alone could lead to a lower average (trend) growth rate for real gross domestic product (GDP). Assume that the average annual growth rate for real GDP during expansions is 3.0 percent and the average annual rate of decline of real GDP during recessions is 2.0 percent, and that the only difference between two scenarios is the length of the expansion. In the first case, assume that the expansion lasts 10 years and the recession lasts two years, then the average rate of real GDP growth over this 12-year period would be 2.17 percent. In another case, assume that over the same 12-year period, there are two expansions of only 4 years each and two recessions of two years each. Under these circumstances, the average rate of real GDP growth over the 12-year period would be 1.33 percent. Clearly, recessions occurring more frequently alone could lower the trend rate of real growth for the economy.

What would cause recessions to occur more frequently? I believe several factors will contribute to this outcome, including a greater role of the federal government in the economy, as well as a greater probability of a monetary or fiscal policy mistake. The end result is that productivity will suffer and that inflation—yes, inflation—will become a problem for the survival of future expansions. In such an environment risk taking is discouraged, which means that innovation is much less likely to occur. It has been my experience that whenever the government gets involved, they tend to promote the status quo, often in the name of jobs. The industries in which the government has increased its role are mature industries in need of a major innovation of some sort. They are finance, medical services and transportation.

Financial concerns, especially commercial banks, are less likely to be innovative. They will operate much like highly regulated utilities, effectively setting prices approved by the government and earning a relatively small profit in return for the government’s guarantee that they will survive. After all, the success of bank regulation going forward will be determined by how few banks fail. In such an environment, risk taking will be discouraged by regulators. Although excessive risk is bad, some risk is necessary for businesses to be successful. In other words, the concern is that the baby will be thrown out with the bath water, and productivity improvement will suffer.

Medical services industry also faces considerable new government regulation in connection with the expanded government health insurance program. Once the government programs are up and running, cost control will be paramount to the program. This will lead to increased regulation, which once again will encourage a less efficient version of the status quo. Innovation will be discouraged because service providers will not get paid to do so. They will be paid if they deliver services under a known system, regardless of how antiquated it might be. Once again, productivity gains will suffer.

Finally, the auto industry in the U.S. will be subject to increased regulation and government imposed limitations in return for the government assistance they received. If the federal government is going to provide Chrysler and General Motors with an implicit guarantee of survival, the government will want something in return. The problem is that what the government may want could be damaging to the longer-run competitiveness of the automakers. The result will be even more government intervention in the future; the auto makers will be allowed to function as they are rather than being forced to innovative and change as needed to compete. The result will be a domestic auto industry that will lag the rest of the world in technology and innovation, which eventually will force the industry to fail. Institutions that are too big to fail exist only with government support.

Based on the foregoing discussion, a less productive economy in the long run means that real output growth will be less as well. After all, the potential growth rate for the economy depends on the increase in hours worked and the gains in labor productivity per hour. Assuming that the workweek has very little room to expand further over the long run, total hours worked will be determined by the growth in the labor force. The Census Department estimates that the non-institutionalized population aged 16 and over will increase at about a 0.8 percent pace over the next two decades. Whether the U.S. economy grows faster than 0.8 percent each year will depend on the average annual gain in labor productivity. Over the last three decades, labor productivity increased at an average annual rate of 2.0 percent. Over the next two decades, productivity is expected to grow at a somewhat slower pace—more like 1.5 percent.

The implication is that the U.S. economy’s potential growth rate for the next two decades will be 2.3 percent or so rather than the 2.8 percent pace over the last three decades. With less potential for the economy to grow, the likelihood of a mistake by policymakers increases. After all, policymakers, in an attempt to avoid deflation, will try to push the economy to grow faster than what they perceive to be the potential growth rate for the economy. The problem arises if the actual potential growth rate turns out to be less than what they think it is, creating upward pressure on prices and wages. The end result will be more frequent booms and busts for the U.S. economy. What is even more frustrating about this scenario is that the process is most likely already underway.

In addition, the rest of the world probably will experience a similar fate, if not for similar reasons. The stellar productivity gains that have been realized in recent decades in emerging economies are unlikely to continue unabated forever. For example, China’s potential annual growth rate, which many estimate to be 10 percent, is probably within a decade of slowing as well, given the challenge of sustaining the strong productivity gains needed to sustain such a pace. In other words, at some point in the next decade, even China may struggle with an inflation problem.


The views expressed here reflect the views of Daniel Laufenberg as of the date referenced. These views may change as economic fundamentals and market conditions change. This commentary is provided as a general source of information only and is not intended to provide investment advice for individual investor circumstances. Past performance does not guarantee future results.


November 2009 - LEQ (PDF)
February 2010 - LEQ
May 2010 - LEQ


Executive Summary

Forecast Details

The Economic Expansion Continues

A less robust US economy longer term

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Executive Summary

Forecast Details

The Economic Expansion Continues

A less robust US economy longer term

~ ~ ~ ~




Executive Summary

Forecast Details

The Economic Expansion Continues

A less robust US economy longer term

~ ~ ~ ~